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Abstract—The old mantra of decentralizing the Inter-
net is coming again with fanfare, this time around the
blockchain technology hype. We have already seen a tech-
nology supposed to change the nature of the Internet: peer-
to-peer. The reality is that peer-to-peer naming systems
failed, peer-to-peer social networks failed, and yes, peer-
to-peer storage failed as well.
In this paper, we will review the research on distributed
systems in the last few years to identify the limits of
open peer-to-peer networks. We will address issues like
system complexity, security and frailty, instability and
performance.
We will show how many of the aforementioned prob-
lems also apply to the recent breed of permissionless
blockchain networks. The applicability of such systems to
mature industrial applications is undermined by the same
properties that make them so interesting for a libertarian
audience: namely, their openness, their pseudo-anonymity
and their unregulated cryptocurrencies. As such, we argue
that permissionless blockchain networks are unsuitable to
be the substrate for a decentralized Internet.
Yet, there is still hope for more decentralization, albeit
in a form somewhat limited with respect to the libertarian
view of decentralized Internet: in cooperation rather than
in competition with the superpowerful datacenters that
dominate the world today. This is derived from the
recent surge in interest in byzantine fault tolerance and
permissioned blockchains, which opens the door to a world
where use of trusted third parties is not the only way to
arbitrate an ensemble of entities. The ability of establish
trust through permissioned blockchains enables to move
the control from the datacenters to the edge, truly realizing
the promises of edge-centric computing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The constant struggle between the forces of centraliza-
tion and decentralization is inherent to the human nature
and history. In the end, there is always a competition
for power involving control and trust. In a centralized
system, the participants must trust a central entity, which
can effectively exercise control over them. In a decentral-
ized system, both trust and control are spread between
the participants.
In technology, we already witnessed the same compe-
tition. In the origins of the Internet, cybernetics theorists
foresaw a novel electronic frontier which would be de-
centralized, egalitarian, libertarian, and beyond the scope
of traditional states. The birth of personal computing and
the advent of the earliest virtual communities served to
instantiate such a decentralized vision. However, even
though the design of the Internet is inherently decentral-
ized by nature, in practice, key functionalities rely on
a very few service providers [1], who support and thus
may effectively control the Internet.
In this line, more than 75% of the CDN market is
controlled by three providers [2], while five cloud ser-
vice providers control around 60% of the cloud market
share [3]. Things are actually worse than what these
numbers indicate individually, because a small set of
entities in fact dominate several of these markets. For
instance, Amazon alone controls almost 33% of the
cloud infrastructure market share, and through Cloud-
Front, almost 40% of the CDN market. Across different
core Internet services there is a similar concentration of
power amongst a very few big players.
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While such a de facto centralization is likely a natural
effect of market dynamics such as preferential attach-
ment and a manifestation of power-law rather than a
consequence of any technological bottlenecks, it is nev-
ertheless a cause for concern due to a myriad of reasons,
including the existence of a single point of failure, the
structural risk of massively correlated failures, as well
as privacy, censorship and anti-competition issues.
In a previous wave of unsuccessful attempts, the peer-
to-peer technology had seemed the key to providing
a decentralizing Internet, because of an implicit belief
that with a large user base, a proportionate amount
of resources could be aggregated to scale peer-to-peer
services; and yet no single entity actually controls the
service, which is inherently decentralized.
With the advent of peer-to-peer cryptocurrencies, there
has been a new wave of optimism, hoping that the incen-
tive models of participation, resource contribution and
consensus in crypto-currencies could provide a substrate
for a decentralized Internet.
We argue that, unfortunately, despite addressing some
of these issues in a self-contained manner, namely,
making decentralized currencies feasible, decentralized
permissionless blockchains remain ill-suited to be a
substrate for a fully decentralized Internet.
The first goal of this article is to justify this claim
based on a historical review of existing literature in
distributed systems. Particularly, we aim at showing the
limits of open peer-to-peer systems and explain severe
inherent problems (system complexity, security, fragility,
performance) that preclude their indiscriminate adoption.
In particular, the incentive mechanisms that attract the
resources for mining operations and thwart sybil attacks
do not directly translate into a stable environment for
creating other services such as storage or processing in
a sustained manner, or in a stable priced manner which
will be essential in the long term for both the resource
providers and consumers.
The second goal of this article is to present our vision
for a decentralized Internet relying on a combination
of permissioned blockchain networks, cloud computing,
and edge-centric computing. As we can see in Figure
1, permissioned blockchain networks could provide de-
centralized trust, edge-centric computing could ensure
decentralized control, and cloud computing may become
a true utility offering stable resources to users and
organizations.
While there is an important economic drive towards
centralization, technologically speaking, we must not
forget that “everything is in the edge”: the humans that
Fig. 1: Centralized cloud model (left) versus Edge-
centric Computing and Permissioned Blockchains
(right).
use the services, the fact that they are close to each
other, the intelligent decisions and actuations that must
be carried out. All these prompt an edge-centric architec-
ture [4], consisting of a federation including not only big
cloud datacenters, but also nano datacenters and personal
devices. Control is moved to the edge, but leveraging
the stable resources in the cloud. In this setup, while
security and privacy are achieved through technologies
such as end-to-end encryption, permissioned blockchains
and smart contracts may enable trust between a medium-
to-large collection of players, negotiations, validation of
contractual obligations, (micro)payments among these
entities.
We advocate for the ability to pool organizational
and inter-organizational resources at the edge together,
forming federations which possibly include public cloud
services, and thus realizing decentralized applications or
domain/industry specific islands of Internet, which do
not suffer from the maladies of a de facto centralized In-
ternet. In fact, we argue, it is feasible precisely with per-
missioned and private blockchains (something we have
in fact started witnessing in their early avatars in several
sectors, particularly including supply chains, banking
sector, national blockchains), without the burdens of
a permissionless blockchain. Furthermore, if the issue
of interoperability of multiple blockchains is addressed
properly, one can imagine multiple such decentralized
groups which each rely on individual blockchains, form-
ing amalgams (within as well as across domains/indus-
tries), to add to the degree of decentralization.
II. HISTORY OF P2P NETWORKS
Peer-to-peer networks emerged in 1999 with the Nap-
ster service for sharing music files. Napster’s architecture
relied on a centralized index server for locating files
that were later downloaded from peers. This network, as
many other peer-to-peer networks afterwards, was com-
pletely open (permissionless in blockchain terminology).
Anyone could enter the network with their PC and begin
sharing files with others.
The system was finally closed due to copyright issues,
but other alternatives rapidly emerged. The first one
was Gnutella, a completely decentralized overlay that
relied on partial flooding for query messages. Gnutella
is considered an unstructured overlay because nodes do
not form any systematic topology and instead connect
among themselves in a random manner.
Gnutella, however, was slow and inefficient, and
users abandoned it very quickly when better alternatives
emerged. Superpeer overlays solved the problem includ-
ing a layer with more stable peers that boosted the overall
performance. Many systems like Kazaa, eMule, eDonkey
or even Skype relied on such superpeer architecture.
At the same time, peer-to-peer research sprouted with
very interesting contributions, e.g., gossip based proto-
cols for scalable group communication and DHTs that
have inspired the design of key-value stores and the data
model for many NoSQL systems.
A. Decentralizing Internet with DHTs
The first decade of this century witnessed the emer-
gence of the concept of structured overlays, or Dis-
tributed Hash Tables (DHTs), with numerous proposals
such as CAN [5], Chord [6], Pastry [7] and Kademlia [8].
In the academic world, everything could be built on
top of a DHT. Researchers proposed decentralized nam-
ing systems [9], decentralized search mechanism [10],
decentralized notification systems [11], decentralized
storage [12], decentralized file systems [13], or decen-
tralized mail notification [14] among many others.
There were so many DHTs that some researchers
presented a common API for structured overlays to pro-
mote interoperability [15]. But they also noticed scarce
adoption of DHTs and proposed a public DHT as an
universal substrate for applications [16].
In many cases, DHT academic designs were fragile
and complex to implement in the real world. But finally,
DHTs were adopted in systems like eDonkey KAD and
BitTorrent DHTs, with millions of users.
Some studies analyzed those massive DHTs [17] [18]
and outlined their major challenges. In particular, open
networks where peers can assign their identities are
prone to Sybil attacks [19]. In a Sybil attack, the idea
is to impersonate thousands of identifiers with a few
powerful nodes in those networks.
In general, these open overlays were scalable and
provided a reliable service, but they were unstable due to
churn and connectivity problems, and suffered some per-
formance problems. For example, Jime´nez et al. reported
that lookups were performed within 5 seconds 90% of
the time in Emule’s Kad, but the median lookup time
was around a minute in both BitTorrent DHTs [20].
The structural fragility of those open networks and
their performance issues precluded their usage in practice
as global substrate for different kinds of applications.
DHT research, however, turned out to be highly benefi-
cial in the design of reliable cloud infrastructure in the
following years.
In any case, the idea of decentralizing the Internet
also inspired several projects that finally went to the
real world. To name a few, we mention Diaspora, as
a decentralized social network (2010), Freedombox, a
personal safe appliance (2010), arkOS (2014), Yacy,
a decentralized search engine (2003), and Wuala, a
decentralized storage system (2008).
The major motivation for all those peer-to-peer al-
ternatives was privacy and the idea of retaking control
of users data. In the era of personal computers, users
were enabled to decide where their data was stored
and processed. But with the advent of cloud (based)
services like Google, Amazon, Dropbox or Facebook,
a selected few of these service providers have access to
a disproportionately vast portion of the data. As a direct
consequence, most online services rely on a very small
set of entities, which is undesirable both in terms of user
privacy and censorship resilience, but also in terms of
being single points of failures.
B. Limitations and problems of open P2P networks
In the end, peer-to-peer technologies faced strong
challenges and problems that finally precluded their
massive adoption and survival beyond in best-effort, file-
sharing applications:
Problem 1: Free Riding and incentives. In gen-
eral, users do not donate their computing, storage and
bandwidth resources for altruist reasons (exceptions like
SETI@ home exist). Normally, users minimize their
time connected until obtaining what they want (video
or music files). This is called free riding, an issue that
was extensively reported in the Gnutella overlay [21].
BitTorrent mitigated the free riding problem by de-
signing the protocol including incentives (tit-for-tat). If
peers do not contribute, others would not reciprocate.
But again, collaboration is only enforced during the
download process. Unfortunately, users have little in-
centive to maintain an open infrastructure like a DHT.
In eDonkey and BitTorrent DHTs, there is high churn
(nodes entering and leaving the network) because of this
lack of incentives.
Incentives can also provoke the opposite effect. If
there are many incentives (economic ones), powerful
economic players could then take over the network to
grasp those incentives. We discuss this point further in
section 3.
Problem 2: Performance problems due to instabil-
ity, heterogeneity and churn. Because of Problem 1,
P2P networks show high heterogeneity and high degrees
of churn. To maintain the service these protocols must
be fault-tolerant and self-adjusting, but this can cause
performance problems and latency. When one needs
any kind of guaranteed quality of service with stringent
constraints such as millisecond response time, or to
process a large volume of transactions, stable cloud
servers have no rival in P2P networks.
Problem 3: Security and fragility of open networks
and peers. In the absence of a centralized bootstrap
process, any node can enter the network without con-
trol. In structured overlays, this also means that they
can assign themselves identifiers, and that the overall
network is vulnerable to sybil attacks. Massive identity
problems were reported in eMule KAD and in Bittorrent
DHTs [17]. Furthermore, peer nodes are more vulnerable
to attacks by third parties. Whereas data centers have
security measures, uncontrolled PCs and user devices
may be exposed by software or hardware vulnerabilities.
Even corporate user devices like WD MyCloud [22]
reported massive vulnerabilities that enabled third-parties
to access the data and open backdoors. Furthermore,
the P2P network itself can act as a potent channel for
spreading malwares.
Problem 4: System complexity and maintenance.
Last but not least, programming and maintaining peer-
to-peer software system is a complex task. Programming
distributed systems that must be fault-tolerant, self-
adjusting, and scalable is a challenging task. Further-
more, open protocols may have a myriad of faulty imple-
mentations provoking continuous problems. BitTorrent’s
creator Bram Cohen complained about the low quality
of many BT clients and considered releasing a closed
protocol and client for its novel streaming service. Wuala
discontinued the P2P storage and moved completely to
cloud storage in part motivated by software complexity
and instability.
Apart from these problems, some researchers discov-
ered that for many networks, O(1) networks or one-hop
overlays [23] were feasible. In particular, [24] demon-
strated that for networks between 10K and 100K it is
possible to have full membership routing information and
provide one-hop routing. If the overlay is relatively stable
like a corporate network, then O(1) routing and full
membership is the right decision instead of maintaining
routing tables and suffering multi-hop lookups.
The research on DHTs, gossip-based protocols, and
O(1) overlays clearly paved the way to distributed cloud-
based key-value stores and NoSQL systems. For exam-
ple, Amazon Dynamo [25] leverages structured over-
lays (Chord, Pastry), gossip-based communication, and
one-hop overlays. Dynamo, like other scalable NoSQL
systems, is built on top of stable and trusted cloud
servers which avoids problems 1-4 but also simplifies
considerably the software architecture and boosts the
overall performance.
Even if content-addressable storage and object stor-
age devices already existed, DHTs also influenced the
creation of cloud object storage systems following the
same principles of key-value stores but for big storage
blobs. In this line, Azure Storage [26] is inspired by
Amazon Dynamo and Cassandra, among others. Cloud
Object Stores like Amazon S3 or Azure Storage were
massively adopted by large applications like Dropbox,
Netflix and many others. Amazon S3 claimed 2 trillions
objects already in 2013.
C. Decline of P2P
Even if many of the innovations from P2P research
were incorporated in and inspired the design of humon-
gous datacenters, the advent of cloud computing also
killed the P2P star. Research on peer-to-peer dried up
and the major conferences dedicated to the theme ceased,
IPTPS in 2010 and IEEE P2P in 2015.
BitTorrent accounted for 35% of Internet traffic in
2004, but only 3% in 2018. Diaspora only reached
one million users, and many projects were abandoned:
arkOS, OpenDHT, or Yacy among many others. Wuala
abandoned their P2P storage mechanisms and focused
entirely in cloud storage. Later on it was acquired by
Seagate. Skype changed its superpeer-based approach
with data center based stable servers.
And traffic in the major P2P file-sharing sites like
eDonkey or BitTorrent notoriously declined, in part be-
cause of cloud-based legal sites such as Netflix, Amazon
Prime Video and so on.
Today, the world is clearly dominated by GAFAs
(Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple). All major global
services are cloud-based. It seemed that P2P had died or
become marginal, but then cryptocurrencies got main-
stream. We begin to hear again the old drums about
decentralizing the Internet and fight the Big Brother.
III. BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN HYPE
The original Bitcoin paper written by the obscure
Satoshi Nakamoto appeared in 2008 [27]. Nakamoto
proved to the world that an ingenious combination of
existing technologies and economic incentives could
achieve a long-sought goal: a completely decentralized
virtual currency, without intermediaries, open to every-
body but at the same time capable of solving problems
such as double spending and sybil attacks.
A. The basics
Bitcoin and other open blockchains provide the ab-
straction of a single distributed ledger of transactions.
In their most basic forms, transactions look like ‘payer
a sends x bitcoins to payee b’ requests, although more
complex types of transactions exist. Transactions are
collected into blocks, each block containing a hash of the
previous one up to the first (genesis) block, effectively
creating a blockchain (hence the name).
In order to achieve the decentralized verification of
every transaction, the entire blockchain is replicated
among all nodes (peers) forming the network. Participa-
tion is open to everybody; peers may join freely just by
contacting some open bootstraps. Nodes are organized in
an unstructured topology where each peer is connected
to a large number of other peers, randomly. Transactions
generated by nodes are disseminated through the entire
network and verified independently by each node, to
intercept and avoid double spending.
The chain is extended through a process called mining.
Nodes collect transactions into blocks, and then try to
make a new block accepted by everybody else as the
next block in the chain by providing a proof-of-work
through the solution of a cryptographic puzzle: the miner
looks for a random number called nonce, such that when
the block content and the hash of the previous one is
hashed along with the nonce, the result is numerically
smaller than a given difficulty target. The difficulty target
is periodically adjusted in such a way that a new block
is generated every 10 minutes.
As mining is computationally (and economically) ex-
pensive, every time a miner creates a new block, the
miner is rewarded in two ways: through the creation of
new bitcoins and through transaction fees that may be
offered by who requests a transaction to be executed.
This incentive scheme is supposed to keep the network
alive and is a major departure from existing peer-to-peer
networks where free-riding is predominant.
The proof-of-work mechanism is paramount to the
success of the protocol: it enables leader election, pro-
vides a (non-final) byzantine fault-tolerant consensus ser-
vice, guarantees the immutability of the chain and offers
a defense against sybil attacks. The value assigned to a
bitcoin in an open market provides the ultimate incentive
for miners (to spend on the capital investment and op-
erational costs). The creator of the next block is elected
randomly by the process of mining the nonce. Given the
probabilistic nature of the process, the blockchain may
occasionally fork: the chain may be extended by distinct
blocks. As nodes are incentivized to extend the longest
fork, such ephemeral forks quickly disappear, reaching
a (delayed) consensus. The choice of the longest chain
is also useful to guarantee immutability: since blocks
are chained through their hashes, modifying the content
of a block requires to re-compute the proof-of-work for
that block and for any block that follows, obtaining a
chain longer than the official one; a feat possible only if
the attacker possesses more than half of the computing
power. Having multiple (anonymous) identities, as in
sybil attacks, is thus useless.
B. The hype
The growth of interest in Bitcoin had a slow start.
Initially discussed among security researchers and prac-
titioners, the first major users of Bitcoin were black
markets, such as Silk Road. The first official Bitcoin
exchanges were created in 2011. The exchange rate grew
slowly at the beginning ($0.30 in 2011, $5.27 in 2012,
$13.30 in 2013), but things started to definitely change
in 2014, when the rate reached $770, to culminate in
December 2017 when the Bitcoin price peaked (till the
time of finalizing this paper in April 2019) at ∼$19,783.
The increased interest has provoked a gold rush
around Bitcoin mining, with specialized BitFarms
(many of them Chinese) that use specialized hard-
ware and consume tons of electricity. According to the
Economist [28], the Bitcoin energy consumption peaked
at 70TWh in 2018, which is roughly what a country like
Austria consumes.
Cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies have
also attracted a lot of investments. In particular, ini-
tial coin offerings (ICOs) are popular. According to
CoinSchedule, more than one thousand ICOs have been
launched in 2018—almost a three-fold increase with
respect to 2017 [28]–raising more than $21 billions.
To give some examples, Ethereum raised $18m in
2014, Block.one raised $4bn for the EOS blockchain,
and Telegram raised $1.7bn for their cryptocurrency.
Because a rising tide lifts all boats, many old peer-to-peer
companies are also reviving. In this line, the blockchain
startup Tron bought the BitTorrent company for $140m,
and veteran IPFS has revived with FileCoin. FileCoin
leverages IPFS to propose again a decentralized storage
network combining blockchain with proof-of-space and
users resources. FileCoin’s ICO recently received $200
million from accredited investors.
Blockchains are now reviving the idea of decentraliz-
ing the Internet, but now with a lot of investors’ money.
Wired recently reported in a number of decentralized
applications that try to replace cloud ones like DTube
(decentralized YouTube), Graphite Docs (decentralized
Google Docs), Hearth (decentralized Dropbox and Web
hosting service), Props (decentralized video streaming),
FileCoin (decentralized storage), and OpenBazaar (de-
centralized eBay) among others [29].
C. Problems of permissionless blockchain networks
The current investor euphoria around blockchains is
inherently tied to lack of knowledge in complex tech-
nologies. We aim to shed some light on this issue and
to clarify when it is appropriate to use decentralized
technologies like blockchains, and when it is unnecessary
or even completely absurd.
First of all, any decentralized peer-to-peer overlay with
open membership still suffers the four problems stated
before. This also applies to open blockchain overlays like
Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Problem 1: Free riding and incentives. Open P2P
networks must offer incentives so that users stay con-
nected and contribute with their resources (computing,
storage, bandwidth). As stated in the previous section,
if the overlay does not provide enough incentives, the
network can suffer free riding, high instability and churn.
On the contrary, when strong incentives are at play,
external economic actors may appear and even disrupt
the network. In the original Bitcoin paper [27], incentives
are economic and clear: “By convention, the first trans-
action in a block is a special transaction that starts a
new coin owned by the creator of the block. This adds an
incentive for nodes to support the network, and provides
a way to initially distribute coins into circulation, since
there is no central authority to issue them.” The author
also states that peers vote with their CPU power, and
then “it quickly becomes computationally impractical for
an attacker if honest nodes control a majority of CPU
power”.
As the economic value of bitcoins raised in the last
years, these incentives were really attractive for many
companies. Huge commercial BitFarms with specialized
hardware emerged to mine bitcoins. In 2013 six min-
ing pools controlled 75% of overall Bitcoin hashing
power. Nowadays it is almost impossible for a normal
user to mine bitcoins with a normal desktop computer.
Some recent research work [30] indicates that the incen-
tive mechanism of Bitcoin is furthermore flawed. They
present an attack where a minority colluding pool can
obtain more revenue than the pools fair share.
These economic factors are compelling normal users
to quit/stay out from participating in the mining process.
In a broadcast network where all nodes validate transac-
tions, and where the history of transactions grows, each
node requires more bandwidth, more storage, and more
computing power to cope with the flow.
To avoid network shrinkage due to nodes being ex-
pelled by resource limits, some networks are retagging
nodes as light nodes but they still count them in the
global network size metrics. For example, in Ethereum,
a sharding architecture has been introduced to improve
performance which distinguishes between full and light
clients. Full clients validate transactions whereas light
clients do not participate in transactions.
Furthermore, given the volatility of cryptocurrency
valuations, this leads to a situation significantly worse
than usual commercial cloud based services, by causing
great pricing instability and uncertainty both for the
service consumers, and also the resource contributors.
Problem 2: Performance problems. One of the most
severe problems of blockchains is performance. While
VISA is processing 24,000 transactions per second,
Bitcoin can process between 3.3 and 7 transactions per
second, and Ethereum around 15 per second. This is the
consequence of a large unstructured broadcast network
where all nodes validate transactions. VISA can rely on
a smaller pool of cloud servers that partition traffic and
handle tons of transactions per second.
In this line, Ethereum’s creator Vitalik Buterin
proposed the scalability trilemma that states that a
blockchain technology can only address two of the
three challenges: scalability, decentralization, and secu-
rity [31]. For Buterin, scalability is defined as being able
to process O(n) > O(c) transactions, where c refers to
computational resources (including computation, band-
width and storage) available at each node, and n refers
to the total size of the ecosystem.
In fact, although most cryptocurrencies and
blockchains claim decentralization, many of the new
and existing networks are proposing more centralized
designs to increase the overall performance. The
so-called layer 2 or off-chain solutions like Lightning
network (Bitcoin), Plasma (Ethereum) or EOS follow
this trend. In these cases, transactions are processed by
a much smaller set of peers (outside the core network)
to increase performance.
An important strength of permissionless blockchains
is that everybody can join, irrespective of who they are.
This is a big departure from traditional byzantine fault
tolerance, where the number of entities participating in
the protocol is limited. Openness come with a price,
though. To avoid sybil attacks, Bitcoin adopted proof-
of-work, resulting in a huge waste of energy resources.
Alternative approaches based on proof-of-X, where X
could be stake, space, activity, etc. seem not be able to
fully address this problem [32] so far.
Our criticism on performance is clearly associated to
the current breed of permissionless blockchains; it is
possible that future blockchains improve their overall
performance. But they are not designed as a general
purpose computing and storage platform for third-party
applications. So the basic question will be: will the
additional price tag to be payed to be open and decen-
tralized be ever small enough to make permissionless
blockchains competitive against cloud implementations?
A completely open network of thousands of heteroge-
neous nodes is a serious burden for performance, and in
direct conflict with commercial uses of the technology
requiring efficient transactions and transfers.
Problem 3: Security and fragility of open networks
and peers Security is another very relevant issue in a
permissionless or open blockchain networks like Bitcoin
or Ethereum. Attackers in this case have economic incen-
tives to break the system. In this line, Bitcoin has been
the target of many attacks and hacks as reported in [33].
Not only users lost their bitcoins in those attacks, but
even big Bitcoin exchange sites like Mt. Gox, Bitfinex
or BitStamp reported major intrusions stealing them of
millions worth in bitcoins.
Ethereum has also its own history of attacks and hacks.
In 2016, the DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organi-
zation) raised US$150 millions to fund the project, but
a hacker found a bug in the code that enabled him to
make off with US$50 millions in ether currency. This
even provoked a fork creating two networks: Ethereum
Classic and Ethereum. From 2016, Ethereum suffered
a second fork and they are still increasing their DDoS
protection and security countermeasures to protect the
network and code.
The decentralized apps (DApps) built on top of smart
contracts are another important source of vulnerabilities
(even inside sandboxed VMs). For example, in 2017, a
game called CryptoKitties (built using smart contracts)
went viral and traffic on Ethereums network rose sixfold
provoking the failure of many transactions.
In any case, while smart contracts enable all sorts of
experiments and even the creation of new cryptocurren-
cies that leverage the Ethereum network, Blockchains are
still an open experiment with many challenges to solve.
Problem 4: System complexity and maintenance.
The last important problem is system complexity and
software maintenance/evolution. The code of permis-
sionless blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum is huge
and complex, and is constantly evolving to cope with
software updates, security issues and new features.
It is clear that decentralized systems are clearly more
complex to develop and maintain than their centralized
counterparts. As we already explained, this was in part a
strong reason to abandon peer-to-peer storage and focus
on cloud storage by companies like Wuala.
In Ethereum, the software is even more complex
because of the EVM and Smart Contracts. Using the
Solidity language it is possible to develop code and
create DApps that run on top of the Ethereum network.
DApps are small scripts that can transfer currency and
connect users. They are good at coordinating lots of
computers to perform tasks in exchange for currency
without any central control. For example, with Golem
Dapp, users can sell their machines unused computing
power or buy it from others.
DApps and smart contracts, however, are complex
to code and fragile. DApps can call into the public
methods of other programs and it is very difficult to
write flawless code. For example, a recent vulnerability
in the Parity Wallet Dapp allowed hackers to steal $30
million in ether. And storing state in a smart contract
may be extremely expensive due to the inherent costs of
the Ethereum network. Ultimately, the incentive mecha-
nisms of cryptocurrencies work well in a self-contained
manner, yet the incentives do not translate to, and even
hinder, other applications.
D. Permissionless blockchains are not the right way
Permissionless blockchain networks are not going to
be the substrate of a decentralized Internet. They are
slow and expensive beasts that are unable to sustain mas-
sive global Internet services. Scalable distributed services
require a combination of stable and fault-tolerant servers,
content-distribution networks, and shared-nothing par-
titioned architectures (like cloud object stores) that do
not fit with open peer-to-peer networks (less with open
broadcast peer-to-peer blockchains).
The consolidation of a core backbone of commercial
stable servers to sustain the cryptocurrency, along with
the expensive and volatile cost of transactions, will drive
out from the network any efforts to use it as a cheap
repository for third-party applications. It is cheaper (and
safer) to use cloud standard services with stable pricing
models. Furthermore, the unnecessary entanglement of
a volatile currency to the services just increase the
uncertainties and risks associated to the platform.
IV. PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAINS TO THE RESCUE
There is a completely different audience that demon-
strated an extensive interest for blockchains: surprisingly,
the same groups that were supposed to be made obso-
lete by (decentralized) blockchains, namely companies,
banks, mortgage registries, governments and so on.
Their attention is not focused on permissionless
blockchains, though. Instead, they promote the devel-
opment of permissioned blockchains, operated by an
ensemble of known entities such as members of a
consortium or stakeholders in a given business context.
Unlike permissionless ones, permissioned blockchains
have means to authenticate the nodes that control and
update the shared state and to authorize who can issue
transactions. Yet, the members of such blockchains do
not necessarily trust each other. They use distributed
mechanisms that act in lieu of a trusted and dependable
third party, maintaining the shared state and mediating
the exchanges. Very often, permissioned blockchains
offer a secure computing engine as well, capable to
execute arbitrary tasks in the form of smart contracts.
Once blockchains are disentangled from cryptocur-
rencies (and the associated incentive mechanisms), an
old problem resurfaces, which has kept busy ranks of
researchers for over two decades: byzantine fault toler-
ance. In fact, the advent of permissioned blockchains
has given new life to research on practical solutions to
problems like consensus, state replication and epidemic
broadcast, in environments where network connectivity
is uncertain, nodes may crash or become subverted by an
adversary, and interactions among nodes are inherently
asynchronous.
Many groups of researchers are competing to de-
velop more and more efficient and secure permissioned
blockchains, such as Hyperledger Fabric [34], Tender-
mint, Symbiont, R3 Corda, just to mention a few.
It is outside the scope of this paper to describe all
of them or to identify a clear winner, but we use
Hyperledger Fabric as a reference architecture for per-
missioned blockchains, given the extensive support its
umbrella project (Hyperledger) receives from the Linux
Foundation and from companies like IBM and Intel.
The software architecture of Hyperledger Fabric is
modular and enables different pluggable components.
It avoids costly proof-of-work by using different con-
sensus algorithms such as crash fault-tolerant (CFT)
or byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols, the latter
based on BFT-SMaRt [35]. Additional needed services
can be exploited and configured as well, such as dis-
tributed membership (associating entities in the network
with cryptographic identities), gossip-based dissemina-
tion services, and smart contracts engines that enable the
execution—in sandboxed environments — of chaincode
software written in standard programming languages.
One distinguishing aspect of Hyperledger Fabric is
that consensus or replication can be configured between
a subset of the nodes of the network, unlike traditional
broadcast networks (like Bitcoin or Ethereum) where all
nodes must participate in all transactions.
In fact, permissioned blockchains are now thriv-
ing as commercial cloud services. Blockchain-as-a-
service (BaaS) offerings have rapidly grown to in-
clude tech industry’s leaders such as Oracle, Amazon,
IBM, or Microsoft among others. For example, Oracle’s
BlockChain Cloud, built on Hyperledger Fabric, can pro-
vide blockchain services over reliable cloud resources,
and thus guaranteeing performance and security. Amazon
is also offering scalable cloud-based blockchain services
like Amazon Quantum Ledger Database (QLDB) and
Amazon Managed Blockchain.
In the next section we will explain why we believe that
permissioned blockchain stacks may become essential
tools for a decentralized Internet.
V. EDGE-CENTRIC COMPUTING AND PERMISSIONED
BLOCKCHAINS: A PROPOSAL FOR DECENTRALIZING
THE INTERNET
In a previous paper, we proposed edge-centric com-
puting as an evolutionary paradigm that will push the
frontier of computing applications, data and services
away from centralized nodes to the periphery of the
network [4]. In the edge-centric vision, “everything is
in the edge”: not only the humans that use the services,
but also the activities that put them in contact in the first
place. Control must be at the edge, because both the
information needed to take decisions and the effects that
the decisions may have are located there. Other edge-
computing and fog-computing approaches just focus on
computation close to the data, where a large amount of
pre-processing is done before dumping the data into the
cloud. In that scenario, edges are mere appendices of the
Cloud, which effectively controls them completely.
But our edge-centric computing proposal missed an
important point: decentralized trust. Our thesis is that
permissioned blokchains combined with decentralized
identity mechanisms are the required building blocks for
the decentralized Internet of the Future.
When interacting devices belong to different adminis-
trative domains, each of them could be an independent
and potentially opportunistic player; so, in order to
cooperate effectively, some level of trust must be gained.
In the real world, trust is normally established by
central authorities, from environmental agencies to food
quality consortiums to government-based services. Such
approach can and is replicated in the online world, where
centralized services put their weight to guarantee an
adequate level of trust.
Yet, with the increase in the number of operations
that are moved from the physical world to the virtual
one, such centralized approach poses both technological
and political concerns. First of all, modern services are
data-intensive and latency-sensitive, sometimes making a
centralized cloud a poor match for them. Not to mention
the dominant position of the few players that are able to
take control of every human activity.
The level of trust and the speed needed by decen-
tralized edge services may be achieved through per-
missioned blockchains. Problems such as authorization
and auditing, two important prerequisites of trust, are
naturally solved in permissioned distributed ledgers.
Furthermore, we do not expect a single global massive
blockchain network as a substrate for a decentralized
Internet. Open permissionless blockchains may become
analogous to the Deep Web/darknet in the current Inter-
net. Anonymous networks designed to hide transactions
and information from the rest of the world. While
federated permissioned networks will heavily rely on
trust and identity, permissionless ones will clearly pivot
towards complete anonymity.
Instead of that, we foresee a myriad of permis-
sioned blockchain networks emerging in vertical do-
mains (health, education, energy, automotive, smart
cities) with participants across value chains, and possibly
located in different legal boundaries (countries, regions,
consortiums). In fact, this is already happening in many
sectors, because there are economic incentives in place
to build these networks, and these incentives are derived
from the business models of the participants, rather than
being self-contained in the blockchain (as is the case
with cryptocurrencies).
The interoperability of these blockchain islands along
with the widespread adoption of decentralized identity
services will create major economies of scale in the
pioneer countries adopting these technologies. We can
present here the analogy of blockchain islands with
autonomous systems or even intranets in the existing
Internet. The inherent multiparty structure of these net-
works, and the variety of them, are perfectly aligned with
the original principles of Internet decentralization.
In principle, many of the blockchain networks may be
confined to national boundaries, but soon, international
blockchain networks will also emerge in different loca-
tions. The European Union is a clear candidate for the
creation of such multinational networks because of its
structure, digital laws (GPDR) and common multiparty
connections in every domain. Such networks could be-
come superhubs for a myriad of lesser national networks.
A. BlockChain islands
We will witness in the coming years how government-
backed blockchain islands will emerge around the
world in different sectors [36]. In this line, on April
2018, 22 european countries already signed the Eu-
ropean Blockchain Partnership (EBP) to cooperate in
the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI)
that will support the delivery of cross-border digital
public services, ensuring security and privacy. Others are
following , like the Australian National Blockchain or the
Smart Dubai Blockchain. Let us review some use cases:
• In supply chain & logistics, distributed ledgers can
be used to verify the trade status of products by
thoroughly tracking them from their origin to the
destination without ever having to explicitly trust
any one node in the network
• In healthcare, institutions suffer from an inability to
share data securely across platforms. Permissioned
blockchains could facilitate hospitals, pharmacies,
patients, clinical research organizations, payers and
other parties in the healthcare value chain to share
access to their networks without compromising on
the data security, privacy and integrity.
• In education, there are strict regulations that the
present day educational institutions follow in order
to be universally accepted and verified. Validation of
academic credentials still remains largely a manual
endeavor. Blockchains could help streamline the
verification process in academia, thereby reducing
fraudulent claims of un-earned educational credits.
• The utilities landscape is evolving into a decen-
tralized and smart power grid, with distributed
power generation from both residential and business
clients. Simultaneously, utilities are investing in
smart meters and upgrading their infrastructures to
turn the distributed and smart power grid into a
reality. As the grid expands and becomes more
distributed, establishing trust between stakeholders
is fundamental to maintaining effective operations.
With blockchains, utilities could provide a trust-
worthy and secure platform for distributed grid and
smart device usage.
What do these business segments have in common?
They are all composed by a collection of players or
stakeholders that do not fully trust each other.
In most of the examples, businesses or legal entities
are involved, willing to cooperate for the good of their
business. They are all capable to dedicate a given amount
of reliable resources to such services. This is a com-
pletely different scenario with respect to where just end-
users are involved, with their limited bandwidth, storage,
computation.
While a centralized solution for each individual use
case may be feasible, it would be in contradiction
with the individual participants’ need to control their
own data in a local manner, e.g., using tokenization
for the blockchain ledger, while controlling the actual
content/services. Such an approach would also lack the
flexibility of organic evolution and portability of mem-
bers and services.
B. Challenges
We foresee interesting challenges in the next years
to combine cloud computing, permissioned blockchains
and edge-centric computing in order to construct the
substrate for a decentralized Internet.
We outline the following relevant challenges:
1) Simplicity and validation of software artifacts:
There is an urgent need to reduce complexity in
the blockchain software stack to ensure its massive
adoption. The complexity and frailty of Solid-
ity and Ethereum and other blockchain software
frameworks hinder their adoption. Blockchain soft-
ware may converge with Serverless FaaS (Function
as a Service) technologies that are gaining traction
in the Cloud thanks to their simplicity and clear
APIs. But more research is needed on software
artifacts, programming abstractions, and software
validation and testing on distributed Blockchain
code and smart contracts.
2) Interoperability and open standards: Mass adop-
tion of Blockchain technologies depends on open
standards to communicate across heterogeneous
platforms. For example, Hyperledger Composer
is offering data integration and connection from
Blockchains to existing systems. Hyperledger Indy
is also offering open decentralized identity services
that may connect heterogeneous services.
3) Security and privacy: A never-ending challenge
is to provide security and privacy in a system
that is constantly under attack. Encryption as a
service using Blockchains is a major challenge to
simplify secure interactions. Decentralized identi-
ties and certificates should seamlessly move be-
tween edge devices and distributed blockchains
networks. More research is required on encrypted
data structures and APIs, sandboxed environments,
verification, secure tokens, and zero-knowledge
proofs over shared content.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We reviewed the existing literature to explain the
problems of open peer-to-peer networks such as insta-
bility, security and system complexity. These problems
caused a clear decline of pure peer-to-peer applications
in the last years. We also explained how many of these
problems still apply to the blockchain open networks
such as Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Our claim is that open permissionless blockchain net-
works cannot become the substrate for a future decentral-
ized Internet. Yet, we believe that more decentralization
in the Internet is still desirable, and can be achieved,
answering to the legitimate call for autonomy from
Internet giants and enhanced protection of users’ privacy.
Permissioned blockchains may be the key to this
revolution, as they have the potential to deliver depend-
ability and trust in a decentralized manner, instead of
relying on any single trusted third party. Our edge-
centric approach leverages the decentralized trust offered
by blockchains, co-opting cloud services as a reliable
utility, while preserving users’ privacy and control for
the Internet of the future.
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